[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":1595},["ShallowReactive",2],{"evidence-index":3,"evidence-doc-the-illusion-of-free-will":384},[4,19,35,48,62,75,94,106,117,129,141,153,164,175,192,206,216,227,240,259,270,280,290,300,312,321,332,344,358,369],{"path":5,"title":6,"description":7,"keywords":8,"field":17,"order":18},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fmaxwells-equations","Maxwell's Equations","Four equations that joined electricity, magnetism and light, and set physics on the road to relativity.",[9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16],"electromagnetism","electric fields","magnetic fields","electromagnetic waves","light","Gauss law","Faraday law","Ampere law","Physical",1,{"path":20,"title":21,"description":22,"keywords":23,"field":34,"order":18},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fnumerology-origin","Numerology Origin","How ancient number symbolism, built to describe cosmic order and interpret sacred texts, became modern personality numerology.",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"number symbolism","Pythagoras","gematria","sacred numbers","divination","history of mathematics","tetractys","monad","decad","perfect number","Historical",{"path":36,"title":37,"description":38,"keywords":39,"field":47,"order":18},"\u002Fevidence\u002Forigin-of-life","Origin of Life","What chemistry, geology and genomics currently tell us about how non-living matter became the first living cells.",[40,41,42,43,44,45,46],"abiogenesis","RNA world","Miller-Urey experiment","prebiotic chemistry","hydrothermal vents","protocells","LUCA","Biological",{"path":49,"title":50,"description":51,"keywords":52,"field":61,"order":18},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fsuffering","Suffering","How Siddhartha Gautama tested both luxury and severe self-denial, and what his diagnosis of suffering became.",[53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60],"Buddhism","Buddha","Siddhartha Gautama","dukkha","Four Noble Truths","Middle Way","Eightfold Path","craving","Cultural",{"path":63,"title":64,"description":65,"keywords":66,"field":74,"order":18},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fthe-evolution-of-trust","The Evolution of Trust","How the prisoner's dilemma, Axelrod's tournaments, and later models explain when cooperation beats selfishness, and when it does not.",[67,68,69,70,71,72,73],"game theory","prisoners dilemma","cooperation","Robert Axelrod","tit for tat","reciprocity","evolutionary dynamics","Social",{"path":76,"title":77,"description":78,"keywords":79,"field":34,"order":93},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fcivil-disobedience","Civil Disobedience","How Gandhi turned a refusal to obey into a political force, why open, nonviolent law-breaking works more often than violence, and where it fails.",[80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92],"civil disobedience","Gandhi","satyagraha","Salt March","nonviolence","ahimsa","Thoreau","Martin Luther King","non-cooperation","nonviolent resistance","Chenoweth","Orwell","wu wei",2,{"path":95,"title":96,"description":97,"keywords":98,"field":47,"order":93},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fplacebo","Placebo","How an inert treatment can change pain, symptoms and brain chemistry, why it works, and where its power ends.",[99,100,101,102,103,104,105],"placebo effect","nocebo","expectation","conditioning","pain relief","clinical trials","endogenous opioids",{"path":107,"title":108,"description":109,"keywords":110,"field":74,"order":93},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fpuer-aeternus","Puer Aeternus","The Jungian \"eternal youth\" archetype, what it describes, what empirical psychology can and cannot say about it, and where such people thrive or struggle.",[111,112,113,114,115,116],"Carl Jung","Jungian psychology","eternal youth","archetype","Peter Pan","adulthood",{"path":118,"title":119,"description":120,"keywords":121,"field":61,"order":93},"\u002Fevidence\u002Ftaoism","Taoism","What the Dao, wu wei and naturalness mean, and why Daoist texts separate caring for something from clinging to it.",[122,123,124,125,126,92,127,128],"Daoism","Laozi","Zhuangzi","Daodejing","Tao Te Ching","yin and yang","attachment",{"path":130,"title":131,"description":132,"keywords":133,"field":17,"order":93},"\u002Fevidence\u002Ftime-dilation","Time Dilation","Why moving clocks and clocks deeper in gravity tick slower, and how the twin paradox resolves.",[134,135,136,137,138,139,140],"special relativity","general relativity","twin paradox","Lorentz factor","proper time","atomic clocks","GPS",{"path":142,"title":143,"description":144,"keywords":145,"field":17,"order":152},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fhiggs-field","Higgs Field","How an invisible field filling all of space gives mass to fundamental particles, and how it was found in 2012.",[146,147,148,149,150,151],"Higgs boson","particle physics","Standard Model","CERN","Large Hadron Collider","symmetry breaking",3,{"path":154,"title":155,"description":156,"keywords":157,"field":47,"order":152},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fmeditation","Meditation","What meditation trains, how it seems to work in the brain, and how strong the evidence really is.",[158,159,160,161,162,163],"mindfulness","attention","neuroscience","brain","stress","contemplative practice",{"path":165,"title":166,"description":167,"keywords":168,"field":61,"order":152},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fthe-god-of-the-gaps","The God of the Gaps","Why explaining unknowns by appeal to God keeps losing ground, and why many theologians reject the move themselves.",[169,170,171,172,173,174],"theology","religion and science","argument from ignorance","naturalism","cosmological argument","fine-tuning",{"path":176,"title":177,"description":178,"keywords":179,"field":74,"order":152},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fthe-illusion-of-free-will","The Illusion of Free Will","A machine that knows what you will choose, what physics and psychology say about the feeling of choosing, and why philosophers still disagree about whether free will exists.",[180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191],"free will","Newcomb's problem","Newcomb's paradox","predictor","Laplace's demon","compatibilism","illusionism","decision theory","one box","two boxes","Wegner","conscious will",{"path":193,"title":194,"description":195,"keywords":196,"field":47,"order":205},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fif-the-world-was-vegan","If the World Was Vegan","A scenario analysis of whether global agriculture could feed everyone without animals, and what it would mean for land, soil and ecosystems.",[197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204],"veganism","plant-based diet","agriculture","livestock","food security","soil fertility","biodiversity","nutrition",4,{"path":207,"title":208,"description":209,"keywords":210,"field":17,"order":205},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fkaluza-klein-reduction","Kaluza–Klein Reduction","How one extra, curled-up dimension turns Einstein's gravity into gravity plus electromagnetism, and why we have not seen it.",[211,212,213,9,214,215],"extra dimensions","compactification","gravity","unification","charge quantization",{"path":217,"title":218,"description":219,"keywords":220,"field":17,"order":226},"\u002Fevidence\u002F13-dimensional-models","13-Dimensional Models","Where the number 13 comes from in theoretical physics, why a universe with two time dimensions is mathematically possible, and why none of it is confirmed.",[221,222,223,224,211,225,212],"string theory","M-theory","F-theory","S-theory","two-time physics",5,{"path":228,"title":229,"description":230,"keywords":231,"field":61,"order":226},"\u002Fevidence\u002F1984","1984","What Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four is about, why he wrote it, and why rival governments have banned or challenged it as propaganda for the other side.",[232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239],"George Orwell","Nineteen Eighty-Four","dystopia","totalitarianism","surveillance","Big Brother","Newspeak","censorship",{"path":241,"title":242,"description":243,"keywords":244,"field":47,"order":226},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fsentience","Sentience","What it means for a being to feel, how science tests it in animals from crabs to oysters, and why a simpler mind does not mean a smaller capacity to suffer.",[245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,197],"sentience","consciousness","animal consciousness","animal pain","oyster","bivalves","hermit crabs","octopus","insects","hard problem","soul","moral status","Cambridge Declaration","New York Declaration",{"path":260,"title":261,"description":262,"keywords":263,"field":17,"order":269},"\u002Fevidence\u002Ftachyons","Tachyons","Hypothetical particles that always move faster than light, why they would carry messages into the past, and why modern physics reads them as a sign of instability instead.",[264,265,266,267,268,134],"faster than light","superluminal","causality","imaginary mass","instability",6,{"path":271,"title":272,"description":273,"keywords":274,"field":17,"order":279},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fclosed-timelike-curves","Closed Timelike Curves","How Einstein's equations permit paths through spacetime that return to their own past, and why no one has ever found one.",[275,135,266,276,277,278],"time travel","wormholes","Godel","chronology protection",7,{"path":281,"title":282,"description":283,"keywords":284,"field":17,"order":289},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fnovikov-self-consistency-principle","Novikov Self-Consistency Principle","Why a journey into the past might never change it, and why that need not require any force preventing change.",[275,285,286,287,266,288],"grandfather paradox","causal loops","closed timelike curves","consistency",8,{"path":291,"title":292,"description":293,"keywords":294,"field":17,"order":299},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fbootstrap-paradox","Bootstrap Paradox","Causal loops in which an object or idea exists only because it was carried into its own past, and whether physics can tolerate them.",[275,295,296,266,297,298],"causal loop","information paradox","entropy","self-consistency",9,{"path":301,"title":302,"description":303,"keywords":304,"field":17,"order":311},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fblock-universe","Block Universe","The view, motivated by relativity, that past, present and future all exist and time does not flow.",[305,306,307,308,309,310],"eternalism","spacetime","relativity","simultaneity","presentism","arrow of time",10,{"path":313,"title":314,"description":315,"keywords":316,"field":17,"order":320},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fdeterminism","Determinism","Whether the present fixes the entire future, what physics says about it, and why free will may survive either way.",[180,266,317,185,318,319],"Laplace demon","chaos","quantum mechanics",11,{"path":322,"title":323,"description":324,"keywords":325,"field":17,"order":331},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fbig-bounce","Big Bounce","The idea that our universe began not from nothing but from the collapse of a previous one, and what physics can and cannot say about it.",[326,327,328,329,297,330],"cosmology","Big Bang","cyclic universe","loop quantum cosmology","eternal return",12,{"path":333,"title":334,"description":335,"keywords":336,"field":17,"order":343},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fgolden-ratio","Golden Ratio","Why one number, the golden ratio, keeps turning up in sunflowers, and why many famous claims about it are myths.",[337,338,339,340,341,342],"phi","Fibonacci","phyllotaxis","spirals","irrational numbers","geometry",13,{"path":345,"title":346,"description":347,"keywords":348,"field":17,"order":357},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fsha-256-encryption","SHA-256 Hashing","How the SHA-256 hash function works, why it cannot be run backwards, and what reversing it would actually require.",[349,350,351,352,353,354,355,356],"cryptography","hash function","SHA256","encryption","preimage resistance","collisions","Bitcoin","brute force",14,{"path":359,"title":360,"description":361,"keywords":362,"field":17,"order":368},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fgrovers-algorithm","Grover's Algorithm","How a quantum computer can search N possibilities in about √N steps, and why that is both remarkable and far less than popular accounts claim.",[363,364,365,366,367,349],"quantum computing","quantum search","qubits","amplitude amplification","oracle",15,{"path":370,"title":371,"description":372,"keywords":373,"field":17,"order":383},"\u002Fevidence\u002Fentropy","Entropy","Why heat flows one way, how a thought experiment about a tiny demon tied physics to information, and whether black holes destroy it.",[297,374,375,376,377,378,379,310,380,381,382],"second law of thermodynamics","Maxwell's demon","Szilard engine","Landauer's principle","information","Boltzmann","black hole information paradox","Hawking radiation","unitarity",16,{"id":385,"title":177,"body":386,"description":178,"extension":1588,"field":74,"keywords":1589,"meta":1590,"navigation":1591,"order":152,"path":176,"seo":1592,"stem":1593,"__hash__":1594},"evidence\u002Fevidence\u002Fthe-illusion-of-free-will.md",{"type":387,"value":388,"toc":1561},"minimark",[389,393,406,409,412,430,435,440,443,447,450,453,498,501,518,522,525,581,895,929,987,990,1004,1011,1015,1022,1026,1034,1037,1048,1052,1059,1063,1070,1074,1082,1097,1101,1109,1116,1120,1125,1131,1135,1142,1181,1188,1192,1195,1202,1212,1218,1222,1226,1229,1237,1241,1255,1259,1267,1274,1280,1284,1318,1322,1329,1346,1349,1353,1368,1385,1399,1416,1430,1447,1464,1481,1493,1510,1527,1544],[390,391,177],"h1",{"id":392},"the-illusion-of-free-will",[394,395,396,397,401,402,405],"p",{},"Two boxes sit on a table in front of you. The first is transparent and holds 1,000 dollars. The second is opaque. You may take ",[398,399,400],"strong",{},"only the opaque box",", or ",[398,403,404],{},"both boxes",".",[394,407,408],{},"Yesterday, a machine studied you. It has run this game with thousands of people and has never been wrong. If it predicted that you would take only the opaque box, it put 1,000,000 dollars inside. If it predicted that you would take both, it left the opaque box empty. The machine has already finished; the money is either there or it is not. Nothing you do now can change what is in the box.",[394,410,411],{},"What do you take?",[394,413,414,415,419,420,426,427,429],{},"Most people find the answer obvious. The difficulty is that they split almost evenly on ",[416,417,418],"em",{},"which"," answer is obvious, and each side tends to think the other is making a simple mistake. ",[421,422,425],"sup",{"className":423},[424],"c-cite","[1,2]"," The puzzle is called ",[398,428,181],{},", and it is one of the sharpest ways of asking a very old question: if something could know in advance what you will choose, in what sense are you choosing?",[431,432,434],"h2",{"id":433},"two-arguments-that-cannot-both-win","Two Arguments That Cannot Both Win",[436,437,439],"h3",{"id":438},"the-case-for-taking-one-box","The case for taking one box",[394,441,442],{},"The machine has never been wrong. People who take one box walk away with a million dollars. People who take both walk away with a thousand. If you want to be rich, be the kind of person who takes one box.",[436,444,446],{"id":445},"the-case-for-taking-both-boxes","The case for taking both boxes",[394,448,449],{},"The money was placed yesterday. The box already contains 1,000,000 dollars or nothing. Whatever it contains, taking both boxes gives you exactly 1,000 dollars more than taking one. Leaving a visible 1,000 dollars on the table cannot make money appear in a box that was sealed before you walked in.",[394,451,452],{},"The four possible outcomes make the conflict visible:",[454,455,456,472],"table",{},[457,458,459],"thead",{},[460,461,462,466,469],"tr",{},[463,464,465],"th",{},"Your choice",[463,467,468],{},"Machine predicted \"one box\"",[463,470,471],{},"Machine predicted \"both boxes\"",[473,474,475,487],"tbody",{},[460,476,477,481,484],{},[478,479,480],"td",{},"Take only the opaque box",[478,482,483],{},"1,000,000 dollars",[478,485,486],{},"nothing",[460,488,489,492,495],{},[478,490,491],{},"Take both boxes",[478,493,494],{},"1,001,000 dollars",[478,496,497],{},"1,000 dollars",[394,499,500],{},"Read across each column, and taking both boxes is always better by 1,000 dollars. Read down the rows, knowing the machine is almost always right, and taking one box is better by nearly a million.",[394,502,503,504,508,509,512,513,517],{},"The problem was invented by the physicist William Newcomb, and first analysed in print by the philosopher Robert Nozick in 1969. ",[421,505,507],{"className":506},[424],"[1]"," Martin Gardner's 1973 column in ",[416,510,511],{},"Scientific American"," brought it to a wide audience and produced a flood of letters from readers, divided and often certain. ",[421,514,516],{"className":515},[424],"[2]"," Nozick's own summary of his informal polling remains accurate: the problem looks easy to almost everyone, but not in the same way.",[431,519,521],{"id":520},"the-formal-description","The Formal Description",[394,523,524],{},"Decision theory tries to say what a rational agent should do. Newcomb's problem separates two of its main versions.",[394,526,527,530,531,534,535,580],{},[398,528,529],{},"Evidential decision theory"," asks: ",[416,532,533],{},"given that I make this choice, what should I expect to get?"," Suppose the machine is right with probability ",[536,537,540,561],"span",{"className":538},[539],"katex",[536,541,544],{"className":542},[543],"katex-mathml",[545,546,548],"math",{"xmlns":547},"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F1998\u002FMath\u002FMathML",[549,550,551,557],"semantics",{},[552,553,554],"mrow",{},[555,556,394],"mi",{},[558,559,394],"annotation",{"encoding":560},"application\u002Fx-tex",[536,562,566],{"className":563,"ariaHidden":565},[564],"katex-html","true",[536,567,570,575],{"className":568},[569],"base",[536,571],{"className":572,"style":574},[573],"strut","height:0.625em;vertical-align:-0.1944em;",[536,576,394],{"className":577},[578,579],"mord","mathnormal",". Then the expected payoffs are",[536,582,585],{"className":583},[584],"katex-display",[536,586,588,672],{"className":587},[539],[536,589,591],{"className":590},[543],[545,592,594],{"xmlns":547,"display":593},"block",[549,595,596,669],{},[552,597,598,602,607,611,614,617,619,622,626,629,633,635,637,640,642,644,647,650,653,656,659,661,664,666],{},[555,599,601],{"mathvariant":600},"double-struck","E",[603,604,606],"mo",{"stretchy":605},"false","[",[608,609,610],"mtext",{},"one box",[603,612,613],{"stretchy":605},"]",[603,615,616],{},"=",[555,618,394],{},[603,620,621],{},"⋅",[623,624,625],"mn",{},"1,000,000",[603,627,628],{"separator":565},",",[630,631],"mspace",{"width":632},"2em",[555,634,601],{"mathvariant":600},[603,636,606],{"stretchy":605},[608,638,639],{},"both",[603,641,613],{"stretchy":605},[603,643,616],{},[623,645,646],{},"1,000",[603,648,649],{},"+",[603,651,652],{"stretchy":605},"(",[623,654,655],{},"1",[603,657,658],{},"−",[555,660,394],{},[603,662,663],{"stretchy":605},")",[603,665,621],{},[623,667,668],{},"1,000,000.",[558,670,671],{"encoding":560},"\\mathbb{E}[\\text{one box}] = p \\cdot 1{,}000{,}000,\n\\qquad\n\\mathbb{E}[\\text{both}] = 1{,}000 + (1-p)\\cdot 1{,}000{,}000 .",[536,673,675,712,733,797,825,846,867],{"className":674,"ariaHidden":565},[564],[536,676,678,682,686,690,697,701,705,709],{"className":677},[569],[536,679],{"className":680,"style":681},[573],"height:1em;vertical-align:-0.25em;",[536,683,601],{"className":684},[578,685],"mathbb",[536,687,606],{"className":688},[689],"mopen",[536,691,694],{"className":692},[578,693],"text",[536,695,610],{"className":696},[578],[536,698,613],{"className":699},[700],"mclose",[536,702],{"className":703,"style":704},[630],"margin-right:0.2778em;",[536,706,616],{"className":707},[708],"mrel",[536,710],{"className":711,"style":704},[630],[536,713,715,719,722,726,730],{"className":714},[569],[536,716],{"className":717,"style":718},[573],"height:0.6389em;vertical-align:-0.1944em;",[536,720,394],{"className":721},[578,579],[536,723],{"className":724,"style":725},[630],"margin-right:0.2222em;",[536,727,621],{"className":728},[729],"mbin",[536,731],{"className":732,"style":725},[630],[536,734,736,739,742,749,753,759,762,765,769,773,776,779,785,788,791,794],{"className":735},[569],[536,737],{"className":738,"style":681},[573],[536,740,655],{"className":741},[578],[536,743,745],{"className":744},[578],[536,746,628],{"className":747},[748],"mpunct",[536,750,752],{"className":751},[578],"000",[536,754,756],{"className":755},[578],[536,757,628],{"className":758},[748],[536,760,752],{"className":761},[578],[536,763,628],{"className":764},[748],[536,766],{"className":767,"style":768},[630],"margin-right:2em;",[536,770],{"className":771,"style":772},[630],"margin-right:0.1667em;",[536,774,601],{"className":775},[578,685],[536,777,606],{"className":778},[689],[536,780,782],{"className":781},[578,693],[536,783,639],{"className":784},[578],[536,786,613],{"className":787},[700],[536,789],{"className":790,"style":704},[630],[536,792,616],{"className":793},[708],[536,795],{"className":796,"style":704},[630],[536,798,800,804,807,813,816,819,822],{"className":799},[569],[536,801],{"className":802,"style":803},[573],"height:0.8389em;vertical-align:-0.1944em;",[536,805,655],{"className":806},[578],[536,808,810],{"className":809},[578],[536,811,628],{"className":812},[748],[536,814,752],{"className":815},[578],[536,817],{"className":818,"style":725},[630],[536,820,649],{"className":821},[729],[536,823],{"className":824,"style":725},[630],[536,826,828,831,834,837,840,843],{"className":827},[569],[536,829],{"className":830,"style":681},[573],[536,832,652],{"className":833},[689],[536,835,655],{"className":836},[578],[536,838],{"className":839,"style":725},[630],[536,841,658],{"className":842},[729],[536,844],{"className":845,"style":725},[630],[536,847,849,852,855,858,861,864],{"className":848},[569],[536,850],{"className":851,"style":681},[573],[536,853,394],{"className":854},[578,579],[536,856,663],{"className":857},[700],[536,859],{"className":860,"style":725},[630],[536,862,621],{"className":863},[729],[536,865],{"className":866,"style":725},[630],[536,868,870,873,876,882,885,891],{"className":869},[569],[536,871],{"className":872,"style":803},[573],[536,874,655],{"className":875},[578],[536,877,879],{"className":878},[578],[536,880,628],{"className":881},[748],[536,883,752],{"className":884},[578],[536,886,888],{"className":887},[578],[536,889,628],{"className":890},[748],[536,892,894],{"className":893},[578],"000.",[394,896,897,898,928],{},"Here ",[536,899,901,915],{"className":900},[539],[536,902,904],{"className":903},[543],[545,905,906],{"xmlns":547},[549,907,908,912],{},[552,909,910],{},[555,911,601],{"mathvariant":600},[558,913,914],{"encoding":560},"\\mathbb{E}",[536,916,918],{"className":917,"ariaHidden":565},[564],[536,919,921,925],{"className":920},[569],[536,922],{"className":923,"style":924},[573],"height:0.6889em;",[536,926,601],{"className":927},[578,685]," means the average payoff you would expect over many repetitions. Taking one box has the higher expectation whenever",[536,930,932],{"className":931},[584],[536,933,935,955],{"className":934},[539],[536,936,938],{"className":937},[543],[545,939,940],{"xmlns":547,"display":593},[549,941,942,952],{},[552,943,944,946,949],{},[555,945,394],{},[603,947,948],{},">",[623,950,951],{},"0.5005.",[558,953,954],{"encoding":560},"p > 0.5005 .",[536,956,958,977],{"className":957,"ariaHidden":565},[564],[536,959,961,965,968,971,974],{"className":960},[569],[536,962],{"className":963,"style":964},[573],"height:0.7335em;vertical-align:-0.1944em;",[536,966,394],{"className":967},[578,579],[536,969],{"className":970,"style":704},[630],[536,972,948],{"className":973},[708],[536,975],{"className":976,"style":704},[630],[536,978,980,984],{"className":979},[569],[536,981],{"className":982,"style":983},[573],"height:0.6444em;",[536,985,951],{"className":986},[578],[394,988,989],{},"In words: if the machine is even slightly better than a coin toss, the evidential answer is to take one box.",[394,991,992,995,996,999,1000],{},[398,993,994],{},"Causal decision theory"," asks a different question: ",[416,997,998],{},"what will my choice actually cause?"," Your choice cannot cause yesterday's prediction. Whatever the probability that the box is full, your action does not change it, so the 1,000 dollars is a free addition. The causal answer is to take both boxes. ",[421,1001,1003],{"className":1002},[424],"[3]",[394,1005,1006,1007],{},"Both calculations are internally correct. They disagree because they answer different questions. That is why the problem is still unresolved: in a large survey of professional philosophers published in 2014, about 31% favoured two boxes, about 21% favoured one box, and the remaining respondents chose neither or were undecided. ",[421,1008,1010],{"className":1009},[424],"[4]",[431,1012,1014],{"id":1013},"why-newcombs-machine-is-about-free-will","Why Newcomb's Machine Is About Free Will",[394,1016,1017,1018,1021],{},"The puzzle only works if the machine ",[416,1019,1020],{},"can"," be almost perfect. What would it need?",[436,1023,1025],{"id":1024},"the-physicists-version-of-the-machine","The physicist's version of the machine",[394,1027,1028,1029,1033],{},"In 1814 Pierre-Simon Laplace imagined an intellect that knew, at one instant, every force in nature and the position of every body. For such an intellect, he wrote, nothing would be uncertain: the future would lie open to it like the past. ",[421,1030,1032],{"className":1031},[424],"[5]"," Laplace's imagined predictor is the ancestor of Newcomb's machine.",[394,1035,1036],{},"The idea behind it is simple. If the world is governed by laws that turn one state into the next, then knowing the complete state of your brain and body, the surroundings, and the laws would, in principle, fix what you will do. You are made of particles. Particles obey equations. The conclusion seems to follow: your choice was settled before you felt yourself making it.",[394,1038,1039,1040,1043,1044,1047],{},"That thesis is ",[398,1041,1042],{},"determinism",", and whether physics actually supports it is a separate and genuinely open question, covered in ",[1045,1046,314],"a",{"href":313},". Chaos makes such prediction practically impossible, and quantum mechanics may make it impossible in principle. Newcomb's machine sidesteps both objections by being very good rather than perfect. Even a predictor that reads only your personality, your history, and how you reason about puzzles might do far better than chance.",[436,1049,1051],{"id":1050},"the-feeling-that-remains","The feeling that remains",[394,1053,1054,1055,1058],{},"What is striking is that the feeling of choice survives the thought experiment. Standing in front of the boxes, you still deliberate. You still experience the decision as open. The ",[398,1056,1057],{},"illusion of free will"," is the claim that this experience misrepresents what is happening: that the sense of being the undetermined author of the choice is produced by the brain, not a window onto how choices are actually made.",[431,1060,1062],{"id":1061},"what-psychology-adds","What Psychology Adds",[394,1064,1065,1066,1069],{},"Philosophers argued about free will for more than two thousand years without much data. In the last half-century, psychology has studied the ",[416,1067,1068],{},"experience"," of choosing, which is a narrower question with experimental answers.",[436,1071,1073],{"id":1072},"we-explain-choices-we-did-not-make","We explain choices we did not make",[394,1075,1076,1077,1081],{},"In 1977 Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson reviewed a series of studies in which people confidently explained their own choices with reasons that could not have been the real ones. ",[421,1078,1080],{"className":1079},[424],"[6]"," In one, shoppers asked to pick the best of four identical pairs of stockings showed a strong preference for the right-most item, then cited its quality. None mentioned position, and they rejected the suggestion that position mattered.",[394,1083,1084,1085,1089,1090,1093,1094,405],{},"In 2005 Petter Johansson and colleagues pushed this further. ",[421,1086,1088],{"className":1087},[424],"[7]"," Participants chose which of two photographed faces they found more attractive. On some trials, using sleight of hand, the experimenter handed them the face they had ",[416,1091,1092],{},"not"," chosen and asked them to explain their choice. Most manipulations went unnoticed, and participants gave fluent reasons for a preference they had never expressed. The researchers called this ",[398,1095,1096],{},"choice blindness",[436,1098,1100],{"id":1099},"we-can-feel-we-caused-what-we-did-not","We can feel we caused what we did not",[394,1102,1103,1104,1108],{},"Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley argued in 1999 that the feeling of willing an action is an inference: the mind notices a thought that comes just before an action, is consistent with it, and has no rival explanation, and concludes \"I did that\". ",[421,1105,1107],{"className":1106},[424],"[8]"," In one experiment, two people jointly moved a computer mouse over a screen of pictures. One was secretly an assistant who forced the cursor to stop on a particular picture. When the real participant heard the name of that picture through headphones a second or so before the stop, they rated the stop as more intentional, although they had not produced it.",[394,1110,1111,1112,1115],{},"Wegner developed the argument in his 2002 book ",[416,1113,1114],{},"The Illusion of Conscious Will",". His conclusion was not that nothing causes our actions, but that the conscious feeling of willing is not a reliable report of what does.",[436,1117,1119],{"id":1118},"the-timing-experiments","The timing experiments",[394,1121,1122,1123,405],{},"The best-known evidence, Benjamin Libet's 1983 finding that brain activity begins before people report deciding to move, has been heavily reinterpreted. Later work suggests the early signal may reflect background fluctuations rather than a hidden decision. That debate is covered in detail in ",[1045,1124,314],{"href":313},[394,1126,1127,1130],{},[398,1128,1129],{},"Certainty note."," These studies establish that introspection about choice is unreliable in specific, measurable ways. They do not establish that choices have no conscious causes, and they do not settle free will, which is partly a question about what \"free\" should mean.",[431,1132,1134],{"id":1133},"four-positions","Four Positions",[394,1136,1137,1138],{},"The debate is usually divided into four positions. ",[421,1139,1141],{"className":1140},[424],"[9]",[1143,1144,1145,1160,1169,1175],"ul",{},[1146,1147,1148,1151,1152,1155,1156,1159],"li",{},[398,1149,1150],{},"Hard determinism"," holds that the world is determined and therefore free will does not exist. Popular books such as Sam Harris's ",[416,1153,1154],{},"Free Will"," (2012) and Robert Sapolsky's ",[416,1157,1158],{},"Determined"," (2023) argue a version of this.",[1146,1161,1162,1165,1166,1168],{},[398,1163,1164],{},"Illusionism"," holds that the ",[416,1167,1068],{}," of free will is systematically misleading, whether or not determinism is true. Wegner's work is the psychological version.",[1146,1170,1171,1174],{},[398,1172,1173],{},"Libertarianism"," (in the philosophical, not political, sense) holds that we do have free will, so our choices cannot be fully determined. Its difficulty is explaining how randomness would add control rather than luck.",[1146,1176,1177,1180],{},[398,1178,1179],{},"Compatibilism"," holds that free will does not require escaping causation. You act freely when your action comes from your own reasoning and values rather than from coercion, even if those have causes.",[394,1182,1183,1184,1187],{},"In the 2014 survey of philosophers, compatibilism was the most common view by a wide margin, at close to 60%. Libertarianism and the denial of free will were each held by around 12–14%. ",[421,1185,1010],{"className":1186},[424]," That is a majority, not a consensus.",[436,1189,1191],{"id":1190},"what-the-machine-means-for-each","What the machine means for each",[394,1193,1194],{},"The positions give strikingly different readings of the box game.",[394,1196,1197,1198,1201],{},"For the ",[398,1199,1200],{},"hard determinist",", there is no puzzle about freedom: you were always going to choose what the machine predicted. The only question is which reasoning style earns more money.",[394,1203,1197,1204,1207,1208,1211],{},[398,1205,1206],{},"compatibilist",", the machine is not a threat. It predicts you by modelling your reasoning, so your reasoning is exactly what produces the outcome. A predictable choice can still be ",[416,1209,1210],{},"your"," choice; a friend who always knows you will keep a promise does not make the promise unfree.",[394,1213,1197,1214,1217],{},[398,1215,1216],{},"libertarian",", a perfect predictor would be evidence against free will, which is one reason libertarians doubt such a predictor could exist.",[431,1219,1221],{"id":1220},"can-the-machine-exist","Can the Machine Exist?",[436,1223,1225],{"id":1224},"the-announcement-problem","The announcement problem",[394,1227,1228],{},"Suppose the machine tells you its prediction before you choose. If it says \"you will take both\", you can take one out of spite, and the prediction fails. A predictor can only be reliable about an agent who hears the prediction if the agent cannot or does not act against it.",[394,1230,1231,1232,1236],{},"This is not only a trick. In 2008 the physicist David Wolpert proved general limits on what any physical inference device can predict about a universe that contains it, including limits on predicting other devices that can react to its predictions. ",[421,1233,1235],{"className":1234},[424],"[10]"," Complete self-inclusive prediction is ruled out by logic before physics even enters. Newcomb's machine avoids the problem by staying silent, but the result shows that \"enough information predicts everything\" has limits even in a deterministic world.",[436,1238,1240],{"id":1239},"a-backwards-looking-loop","A backwards-looking loop",[394,1242,1243,1244,1247,1248,1251,1252,405],{},"The one-box intuition becomes almost undeniable if the machine is not a predictor but a time traveller that simply ",[416,1245,1246],{},"watched"," what you did and came back to fill the box. Then your choice really does determine the contents, and taking one box is obviously right. Newcomb's problem sits between that case and an ordinary sealed box, which is why it resembles the consistency puzzles of time travel. Physics has a name for the rule that history must be consistent with its own loops: the ",[1045,1249,1250],{"href":281},"Novikov self-consistency principle",". A related case, in which an effect becomes its own cause, is the ",[1045,1253,1254],{"href":291},"bootstrap paradox",[431,1256,1258],{"id":1257},"does-believing-it-matter","Does Believing It Matter?",[394,1260,1261,1262,1266],{},"If free will is an illusion, should anyone be told? In 2008 Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler reported that participants who read a passage arguing against free will cheated more on a later task. ",[421,1263,1265],{"className":1264},[424],"[11]"," The finding was widely quoted as a reason to protect the belief.",[394,1268,1269,1270],{},"It did not hold up well. A larger set of studies published in 2020, with bigger samples, found that the reading reduced belief in free will but did not reliably increase cheating. ",[421,1271,1273],{"className":1272},[424],"[12]",[394,1275,1276,1279],{},[398,1277,1278],{},"The honest status is:"," a belief in determinism does not appear to make people behave worse, at least not in the ways that have been measured.",[431,1281,1283],{"id":1282},"limitations-and-open-problems","Limitations and Open Problems",[1143,1285,1286,1292,1298,1304,1310],{},[1146,1287,1288,1291],{},[398,1289,1290],{},"No perfect predictor of human behaviour exists."," Real-world prediction of individual choices remains far from Newcomb's machine.",[1146,1293,1294,1297],{},[398,1295,1296],{},"Physics has not settled determinism."," The strongest physical argument for the illusion depends on an assumption that quantum mechanics leaves open.",[1146,1299,1300,1303],{},[398,1301,1302],{},"The psychology is narrow."," Choice blindness and misattributed intention are shown in simple, low-stakes tasks. How far they generalise to deliberate, high-stakes decisions is unknown.",[1146,1305,1306,1309],{},[398,1307,1308],{},"The question is partly conceptual."," Whether free will exists depends on what one means by it. No experiment can decide between compatibilist and incompatibilist definitions.",[1146,1311,1312,1315,1316,405],{},[398,1313,1314],{},"Consciousness itself is unexplained."," Every position assumes there is someone who feels they are choosing. Why there is any such experience is an unsolved problem, discussed in ",[1045,1317,242],{"href":241},[431,1319,1321],{"id":1320},"the-choice-that-remains","The Choice That Remains",[394,1323,1324,1325,1328],{},"Newcomb's problem does not tell you what to take. It shows that \"free will\" names at least two different things: the feeling of an open future, and the fact that your own reasoning produces your actions. The first may be, in part, an illusion. Psychology has shown that the story we tell about our choices can be written after they are made. The second survives even a perfect predictor, because the predictor has to model ",[416,1326,1327],{},"you"," to work.",[394,1330,1331,1332,1334,1335,1337,1338,1341,1342],{},"That distinction runs through other questions on this site. A person who refuses an unjust order, as in ",[1045,1333,77],{"href":76},", is acting from reasons that belong to them, whether or not those reasons had causes. A person who refuses every commitment to keep all options open, as in the ",[1045,1336,108],{"href":107}," archetype, is guarding the first kind of freedom at the cost of the second. The same tension appears in the ",[1045,1339,1340],{"href":63},"prisoner's dilemma",", which the philosopher David Lewis argued in 1979 is a Newcomb problem in disguise: the other prisoner, reasoning as you do, is a mirror of your own choice. ",[421,1343,1345],{"className":1344},[424],"[13]",[394,1347,1348],{},"What we know is that the experience of choosing is unreliable in measurable ways. What physics permits is a world in which a sufficiently informed mind could foresee much of what we do. What remains unresolved is whether that would take anything away from us, or only from the story we tell about ourselves.",[390,1350,1352],{"id":1351},"references","References",[394,1354,1355,1358,1359,1362,1363],{},[398,1356,507,1357],{}," Nozick, R. (1969)."," “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice.”\nIn N. Rescher (Ed.), ",[416,1360,1361],{},"Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel",", 114–146. Dordrecht: Reidel.\n",[1045,1364,1365],{"href":1365,"rel":1366},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002F978-94-017-1466-2_7",[1367],"nofollow",[394,1369,1370,1373,1374,1376,1377,1380,1381],{},[398,1371,516,1372],{}," Gardner, M. (1973)."," “Mathematical Games: Free will revisited, with a mind-bending prediction paradox by William Newcomb.”\n",[416,1375,511],{},", ",[398,1378,1379],{},"229","(1), 104–109.\n",[1045,1382,1383],{"href":1383,"rel":1384},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1038\u002Fscientificamerican0773-104",[1367],[394,1386,1387,1390,1391,1394,1395],{},[398,1388,1003,1389],{}," Weirich, P."," “Causal Decision Theory.”\n",[416,1392,1393],{},"Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy",".\n",[1045,1396,1397],{"href":1397,"rel":1398},"https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Fentries\u002Fdecision-causal\u002F",[1367],[394,1400,1401,1404,1405,1376,1408,1411,1412],{},[398,1402,1010,1403],{}," Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D. J. (2014)."," “What do philosophers believe?”\n",[416,1406,1407],{},"Philosophical Studies",[398,1409,1410],{},"170","(3), 465–500.\n",[1045,1413,1414],{"href":1414,"rel":1415},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1007\u002Fs11098-013-0259-7",[1367],[394,1417,1418,1421,1422,1425,1426],{},[398,1419,1032,1420],{}," Laplace, P.-S. (1814; English translation 1951)."," ",[416,1423,1424],{},"A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities",".\nNew York: Dover Publications.\n",[1045,1427,1428],{"href":1428,"rel":1429},"https:\u002F\u002Farchive.org\u002Fdetails\u002Fphilosophicaless00lapl",[1367],[394,1431,1432,1435,1436,1376,1439,1442,1443],{},[398,1433,1080,1434],{}," Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977)."," “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.”\n",[416,1437,1438],{},"Psychological Review",[398,1440,1441],{},"84","(3), 231–259.\n",[1045,1444,1445],{"href":1445,"rel":1446},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1037\u002F0033-295X.84.3.231",[1367],[394,1448,1449,1452,1453,1376,1456,1459,1460],{},[398,1450,1088,1451],{}," Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005)."," “Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task.”\n",[416,1454,1455],{},"Science",[398,1457,1458],{},"310","(5745), 116–119.\n",[1045,1461,1462],{"href":1462,"rel":1463},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1126\u002Fscience.1111709",[1367],[394,1465,1466,1469,1470,1376,1473,1476,1477],{},[398,1467,1107,1468],{}," Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999)."," “Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.”\n",[416,1471,1472],{},"American Psychologist",[398,1474,1475],{},"54","(7), 480–492.\n",[1045,1478,1479],{"href":1479,"rel":1480},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1037\u002F0003-066X.54.7.480",[1367],[394,1482,1483,1486,1487,1394,1489],{},[398,1484,1141,1485],{}," O’Connor, T., & Franklin, C."," “Free Will.”\n",[416,1488,1393],{},[1045,1490,1491],{"href":1491,"rel":1492},"https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Fentries\u002Ffreewill\u002F",[1367],[394,1494,1495,1498,1499,1376,1502,1505,1506],{},[398,1496,1235,1497],{}," Wolpert, D. H. (2008)."," “Physical limits of inference.”\n",[416,1500,1501],{},"Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena",[398,1503,1504],{},"237","(9), 1257–1281.\n",[1045,1507,1508],{"href":1508,"rel":1509},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1016\u002Fj.physd.2008.03.040",[1367],[394,1511,1512,1515,1516,1376,1519,1522,1523],{},[398,1513,1265,1514],{}," Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008)."," “The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating.”\n",[416,1517,1518],{},"Psychological Science",[398,1520,1521],{},"19","(1), 49–54.\n",[1045,1524,1525],{"href":1525,"rel":1526},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1111\u002Fj.1467-9280.2008.02045.x",[1367],[394,1528,1529,1532,1533,1376,1536,1539,1540],{},[398,1530,1273,1531],{}," Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Crone, D. L., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., & Levy, N. (2020)."," “Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will.”\n",[416,1534,1535],{},"Cognition",[398,1537,1538],{},"203",", 104342.\n",[1045,1541,1542],{"href":1542,"rel":1543},"https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1016\u002Fj.cognition.2020.104342",[1367],[394,1545,1546,1549,1550,1376,1553,1556,1557],{},[398,1547,1345,1548],{}," Lewis, D. (1979)."," “Prisoners’ Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem.”\n",[416,1551,1552],{},"Philosophy & Public Affairs",[398,1554,1555],{},"8","(3), 235–240.\n",[1045,1558,1559],{"href":1559,"rel":1560},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.jstor.org\u002Fstable\u002F2265034",[1367],{"title":1562,"searchDepth":93,"depth":93,"links":1563},"",[1564,1568,1569,1573,1578,1581,1585,1586,1587],{"id":433,"depth":93,"text":434,"children":1565},[1566,1567],{"id":438,"depth":152,"text":439},{"id":445,"depth":152,"text":446},{"id":520,"depth":93,"text":521},{"id":1013,"depth":93,"text":1014,"children":1570},[1571,1572],{"id":1024,"depth":152,"text":1025},{"id":1050,"depth":152,"text":1051},{"id":1061,"depth":93,"text":1062,"children":1574},[1575,1576,1577],{"id":1072,"depth":152,"text":1073},{"id":1099,"depth":152,"text":1100},{"id":1118,"depth":152,"text":1119},{"id":1133,"depth":93,"text":1134,"children":1579},[1580],{"id":1190,"depth":152,"text":1191},{"id":1220,"depth":93,"text":1221,"children":1582},[1583,1584],{"id":1224,"depth":152,"text":1225},{"id":1239,"depth":152,"text":1240},{"id":1257,"depth":93,"text":1258},{"id":1282,"depth":93,"text":1283},{"id":1320,"depth":93,"text":1321},"md",[180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191],{},true,{"title":177,"description":178},"evidence\u002Fthe-illusion-of-free-will","CHYgUCkSF68nj2ZaIylHLsWCza2UyS-dnD2iLU4Z5_0",1789762626406]